U.S. Supreme Court Strikes Down Bans on Corporate Spending in Elections (January 2010)
On January 21, 2010 during a special session, the U.S. Supreme Court in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission held that congressional restrictions on independent expenditures by corporations in federal elections violate the First Amendment. The Court declared that the ban on corporate expenditures "uses censorship to control thought" and amounts to a chill on "core political speech." By a separate vote, the Court did preserve the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act's disclosure requirements as a valid restriction on corporations.
D.C. Circuit Court Strikes Down Campaign Finance Rules (September 2009)
On September 18, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in EMILY’s List v. FEC, No. 08-5422, struck down several campaign finance rules that restrict the ability of non-profits to fund election-related activities such as voter registration, get-out-the-vote efforts, and advertisements.
The Court found that the Federal Election Commission’s (FEC) rules requiring political committees and 527 non-profit groups to fund much of their election activities out of "hard money" accounts violated the First Amendment. Individual donations to the accounts are capped at $5,000 annually. The rules also stated that donations would be considered hard money if they were used to support or oppose a candidate.
The Court also found that the FEC rules overreached the commission’s authority under federal election law.
D.C. Circuit Court Rules HLOGA Provision Constitutional (September 2009)
On September 8, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled in NAM v. Taylor, No. 08-5085, the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act’s (HLOGA) provision requiring trade associations and other lobbying organizations to publicize the names of member companies that support and guide their lobbying efforts is constitutional.
New 2009 Minimum Wage Increase (July 2009)
Effective July 24, 2009, the federal minimum wage set by the United States Department of Labor will increase to $7.25 per hour from the current $6.55 per hour. The increase is the result of a May 2007 amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which boosted the minimum wage in three steps. The first two steps — to $5.85 and then a year later to $6.55 — were implemented on July 24, 2007, and July 24, 2008, respectively.
U.S. Supreme Court Rules City Violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (June 2009)
Two White and Hispanic firefighters sued city officials when the New Haven Civil Service Board (CSB) failed to certify two exams needed to be promoted to Lieutenant and Captain. The CSB did not certify because the results of the test would have promoted a disproportionate number of white candidates in comparison to minority candidates. On June 25, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Ricci et al. v. DeStefano et al., 557 U.S. ____ (2009), that by discarding the exams, the City of New Haven violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the purpose of avoiding a "disparate impact" on a protected trait (race, color, religion, national origin), the employer must have a "strong basis in evidence" that it will be subject to "disparate impact liability" if it fails to take the discriminatory action. The Court reasoned that New Haven failed to prove it had a "strong basis in evidence" that failing to discard the results of the exam would have subjected it to liability, as the exams were job-related, consistent with business necessity, and there was no evidence that an equally-valid, less-discriminatory alternative was available.
U.S. Supreme Court Rules Student's Fourth Amendment Rights Were Violated (June 2009)
On June 25, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Safford Unified School District v. Redding, 557 U.S. ____ (2009), that a middle school student’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated when school officials searched her underwear for non-prescription painkillers. The Court held that, based on a reasonable suspicion, search measures used by school officials to root out contraband must be "reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." In this case, school officials did not have sufficient suspicion to warrant extending the search of the student to her underwear. The Court also held that the implicated school administrators were not personally liable because "clearly established law [did] not show that the search violated the Fourth Amendment."
Court Ruling Limits Workplace Age Discrimination Lawsuits (June 2009)
On June 18, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a ruling in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U. S. ____ (2009), that will make it much harder for older workers to win workplace age discrimination claims. In a 5-4 decision, the court ruled that workers bear the full burden of proving that age was the deciding factor in their dismissal or demotion.
The Supreme Court held that in an ADEA discrimination claim the burden of persuasion does not shift to the defendant employer to prove that it would have taken the action regardless of the plaintiff's age, even when evidence is introduced showing that age was one motivating factor in its decision.The Court held that the plaintiff must prove by a "preponderance of the evidence" that age was the "but-for" cause of the defendant's action. The Court reasoned from the ADEA's plain text and Congressional intent that the Title VII burden shifting framework did not apply to the ADEA.
Lobbying Disclosure Act Guidance Revision (June2009)
On June 9, 2009 the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate revised the written guidance on LDA registration and reporting requirements. However, on June16, 2009, a clarification was issued in response to several questions that were raised. The revision contains changes to the following sections:
- Section 4: Lobbying Registration
- Language concerning the timing of an initial registration of a potential registrant was modified to make clear that a registration needs to be filed at the earliest time that the potential registrant employs a person meeting the definition of a lobbyist.
- Section 6: Quarterly Reporting of Lobbying Activities
- The language emphasizes that if registrants make the LDA Section 15 election, they may not subtract lobbying expenses for state, local, and grassroots lobbying activities from their total reported on Line 13 of LD-2.
- Section 7: Semiannual Reporting of Certain Contributions
- Each lobbyist who is listed or is required to be listed on a LD-1 or LD-2 must file a LD-203 for the time period in which s/he was listed. Filers are expected to know the LDA requirements for listing on a LD-1 or LD-2, and must use reasonable care when completing and submitting forms.
- Contributions to state and local candidates and to party committees not required to be registered with the FEC do not have to be disclosed on a LD-203.
- A charitable organization established by a person before that person became a covered official, and where the covered official has no relationship to the organization after becoming a covered official is not considered to be an organization established by a covered official.
- A covered official’s de minimis contribution to a charity (in proportion to the charity’s overall receipts of contributions) is not an indication of the covered official’s financing of the charity.
- Costs relating to sponsorship of a non-preferential multi-candidate primary/general election debate for a particular office do not have to be disclosed on LD-203.
- Section 8: Termination of a Lobbyist/Termination of a Registrant
- This section provides additional information regarding the circumstances under which a registrant may remove a lobbyist from its active lobbyist list. It also emphasizes that a lobbyist is only relieved from having to file a LD-203 for future semiannual periods by proper removal, on Line 23 of LD-2, for all clients for whom the lobbyist was listed.
Review the Revised Guidance or clarification.
U.S. Supreme Court Upholds 4th Amendment Rights (April 2009)
On April 21, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. ___ (2009), that police may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if it is reasonable to believe that the arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search or that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Police are now required to have an actual reason to justify the vehicle search, instead of being allowed to do it automatically.
This ruling limits the rule established in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) in which the Court held that “when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident to that arrest, search the passenger compartment.”
Family and Medical Leave Act Rules Changed as of January 16, 2009 (January 2009)
The U.S. Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division published a Final Rule under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The final rule became effective on January 16, 2009, and updates the FMLA regulations to implement new military family leave entitlements enacted under the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008. It also includes revisions in response to public comments received on the proposed rule issued in February 2008.
Specifically, section 585 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) amends the FMLA to permit a "spouse, son, daughter, parent, or next of kin" to take up to 26 workweeks of leave to care for a "member of the Armed Forces, including a member of the National Guard or Reserves, who is undergoing medical treatment, recuperation, or therapy, is otherwise in outpatient status, or is otherwise on the temporary disability retired list, for a serious injury or illness." The NDAA also permits an employee to take FMLA leave for “any qualifying exigency (as the Secretary [of Labor] shall, by regulation, determine) arising out of the fact that the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent of the employee is on active duty (or has been notified of an impending call or order to active duty) in the Armed Forces in support of a contingency operation.”